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COMMENT
THE ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF
THE FOREIGN COMPULSION DEFENSE
IN THE ADEA: MAHONEY V. RFEIRL, INC.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.,' which was decided in Feb-
ruary of 1995, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia refused to extend extraterritorial protection of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.2 That same year, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied review.3 Protection was denied after
the Court of Appeals concluded that the employer's liability
was exempted by a foreign law compulsion defense and equat-
ed a collective bargaining agreement in Germany with German
law.4
Currently, approximately 42,000 U.S. citizens are em-
ployed overseas by 17,835 affiliates of 2,167 U.S. parent com-
panies5 operating in at least 121 countries.6 Some contend,
however, that at least 500,000 U.S. citizens work overseas.
Due to the increasing globalization of the economy, and the
escalating number of U.S. citizens employed abroad, a resolu-
tion as to when U.S. employment discrimination rights yield to
* 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
1. Id.
2. See id.
3. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
4. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450.
5. See Alan Gladstone, Transnational Application of Title VII Employment
Protections: A Two-Sided Coin, 6 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 1, 1 (1994).
6. See Michael Starr, Who's the Boss? The Globalization of U.S. Employment
Law, 51 Bus. LAW. 635, 636 (1996).
7. See Gladstone, supra note 5, at 1-2 (1994). Note, however, that this esti-
mate may encompass Americans employed by foreign companies which are not
U.S. affiliates.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
foreign directives is necessary.
In 1984, in response to case law, Congress amended the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act8 (ADEA) to apply
extraterritorially by redefining "employee" to include U.S.
citizens working for U.S. companies overseas.9 Consistent with
the international law principles of comity and sovereignty, and
with the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RESTATEMENT), Congress enacted
the so-called "foreign compulsion defense" to the ADEA.' ° The
remaining employment protection statutes, The Americans
with Disabilities Act" (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act (Title VII), 2  were similarly amended to apply
extraterritorially in 1991."s Accordingly, the ADA and Title
VII also incorporated foreign compulsion defenses. 4 The doc-
trine originated as a defense against extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws. 5 Essentially, the defense exempts
U.S. companies from liability for noncompliance with the U.S.
law when compliance would force the company to violate the
local law of its host country." Stated differently, the company
essentially admits the violation of U.S. law but asks for impu-
nity because the government of the host country forced the
violation. The foreign compulsion defense is typical of statutes
proscribing extraterritorial reach. 7 The defense has, addition-
8. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994).
9. Older American Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat.
1792 (1984) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630 (f)).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
11. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994 &
Supp. I). The act prohibits employment discrimination based on a disability.
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp.
I). The act prohibits discrimination in employment based on national origin, sex,
race, color, and religion.
13. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-1, 12111(4), 12112).
14. See 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-1(b), 12112(c)(1).
15. See 1 JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD § 8.14 at 260 (2d ed. 1981); see also Interamerican Ref. Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1296-98 (D. Del. 1970). For a good
summary of the defense see Michael A. Warner, Jr., Comment, Strangers in a
Strange Land: Foreign Compulsion and the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Employment Law, 11 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 371, 374 (1990).
16. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 15, § 8.14 at 260; see also Older
American Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1792 (1984)
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 630 (f)); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(1); 42 U.S.C §2000e(1)(b).
17. Several U.S. laws have extraterritorial reach. For criticism of extraterrito-
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ally, been construed narrowly by U.S. courts, which have re-
quired U.S. companies to show actual compulsion by an official
government mandate in order to invoke the defense successful-
ly.18 In fact, until the case discussed in this comment, asser-
tion of the defense has only succeeded twice in precluding
liability in employment discrimination cases. 9
In Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., ° a group of U.S. citizens
working for the U.S. subsidiary, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), with its principal place of business in Mu-
nich, Germany, were forced to retire at age sixty-five pursuant
to RFE/RL's collective bargaining agreement executed in Ger-
many. The plaintiffs challenged the mandatory retirement
provision under the ADEA, since termination of employment
on the basis of age is discrimination on its face and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit in
the District of Columbia on the plaintiffs' behalf. RFEJRL in-
voked the foreign compulsion defense by alleging the collective
bargaining agreement, which was approved by the Munich
Labor Court, was law in Germany. The EEOC21 contended
that no defense, including foreign compulsion, exempted liabili-
ty.2 The district court in Mahoney had essentially taken the
rial applications of U.S. law see James Michael Zimmerman, Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of Federal Labor Laws: Congress's Flawed Extension of ADEA, 21 CORNELL
INVt L.J. 103 (1988).
18. See infra Part MI.B.1.
19. See infra Part III.B.3.
20. 818 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
21. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII vests
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with investigation and en-
forcement authority. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1985 & Supp. 1997) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. I) (Title VII). Essentially, the EEOC issues regulations
under, and monitors compliance with, employment discrimination laws. Accordingly,
the EEOC is the executive agency through which private litigants file employment
grievances. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2 000e-5 (1985). The Commission has the
capacity to resolve some disputes and may bring suits in U.S. courts on plaintiffs'
behalf. The EEOC also issues published guidelines for interpreting employment
legislation.
22. The EEOC, of course, would not have brought suit on the plaintiffs' behalf
if they believed a defense exempted liability. It is noteworthy that the district
court's opinion in Mahoney, which denied the invocation of the foreign compulsion
defense, is cited by the EEOC as exemplary of the agency interpretation and anal-
ysis of the foreign compulsion defense. See EEOC, EEOC NOTICE 915.002, EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF TITLE VII AND ADA TO AMERICAN FiRMs
OVERSEAS AND To FOREIGN FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES, (Oct. 20, 1993), reprint-
ed in EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2169 at 2313-28 (1995).
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same position. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court,
holding the foreign compulsion defense was successfully in-
voked by equating the collective bargaining agreement with
law.' The Supreme Court denied review.'
This comment analyzes the Court of Appeals' opinion. Part
II reviews the extraterritorial application of the ADEA prior to
its amendment. Part III discusses the amendment itself. Part
III.B explains the foreign compulsion defense, elaborating on
its narrow interpretation and its requirement for actual gov-
ernment compulsion to be invoked successfully and discussing
its success in past employment discrimination cases. Part IV
provides the facts of Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc. and part V
analyzes the opinion. This comment concludes that the Court
of Appeals reached an unjust result; U.S. seniors were wrongly
discharged due to a blatant exercise of age discrimination.
Further, this comment concludes that the Court of Appeals
employed an improper analysis by allowing the foreign compul-
sion defense to preclude liability. The reasoning in the Court of
Appeals' opinion was a departure from precedent and vitiated
Congressional intent to extend the act's reach overseas. Most
importantly, this case will have a dangerous stare decisis ef-
fect. Since the global economy is increasingly interdependent
and U.S. multinational companies continue to establish subsid-
iaries on foreign shores, the Supreme Court must determine
the appropriate construction of the foreign compulsion defense.
If such a resolution is not made, not only will U.S. citizens be
victimized by violative corporate conduct, but courts will con-
tinue to adopt broad constructions of the foreign compulsion
defense to deny extraterritorial application of U.S. laws that
have incorporated this defense.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND JUDICIAL APPLICATION
PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT
The ADEA was enacted in 1967 to prohibit employment
discrimination based on older age, particularly with regard to
compensation, hiring, and termination.' The stated purpose
23. See Mahoney v. RFEfRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
24. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
25. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)).
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of the act was "to promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment; [and] to help employers and work-
ers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment."26
Prior to the ADEA's amendment, courts ignored the
EEOC's interpretation that the law applied extraterritoriall y 7
and refused to extend this type of protection to U.S. seniors'
employed overseas. Courts enunciated two rationales: (1) the
absence of clear Congressional intent to do so; and (2) the
provisions of the ADEA itself which precluded such an applica-
tion. In accordance with Blackmer v. United States29 and
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo0 courts refused to extend the
ADEA extraterritorially absent a clear expression from Con-
gress to do so. The language in the ADEA which was construed
to preclude extraterritorial reach was borrowed from the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).3 ' Provisions of the FLSA were
incorporated into the ADEA to assist with enforcement and
procedural aspects. 2 The FLSA explicitly applied only within
26. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
27. The EEOC's position was that the act applied to U.S. citizens employed by
U.S. companies overseas reasoning that the substantive provisions are analogous to
Title VII, which some courts had held applies overseas. The EEOC interpreted the
legislative history of Title VII as supporting extraterritorial application. Further,
the agency reasoned that nothing should preclude U.S. citizens employed overseas
from retaining their protection. See EEOC: Policy Statement on the Application of
Title VII To American Companies Overseas and to Foreign Companies, 401 Fair
Empl. Prac. Rep. (BNA) 6063, 6064 (1988).
28. The age categorization of U.S. citizens who fall within the act's protection
is 40-65. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
29. 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
30. 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949).
31. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
32. See Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1985).
Section 626(b) of the ADEA reads in pertinent part:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except
for subsection (a) thereof) and 217 of this title and subsection (c) of this
section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be
deemed to be a prohibited act under section 215 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Section 216 is part of the Federal Labor Standards Act and
provides that an employer will not be:
subject to any liability or punishment under this Act . . . on account of
his failure to comply with any provision or provisions of such Act ...
with respect to work heretofore or hereafter performed in a workplace to
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U.S. territory."3 Consequently, prior to the amendment, courts
used these two rationales to deny extraterritorial application of
the ADEA.
Every court with occasion to consider the issue of extrater-
ritoriality of the ADEA denied it by contending that a legisla-
tive directive was necessary, and by adopting the questionable
analysis that the incorporation of FLSA provisions precluded
extraterritorial reach.' For instance, in Cleary v. United
States Lines, Inc., 5 the Third Circuit agreed with the district
court that "'[there is no valid policy reason why this country's
laws against age discrimination should not apply to American
citizens employed by American companies abroad.'"36 Like the
district court, though, the Third Circuit concluded that the
policy justifications for extension of the ADEA beyond U.S.
territory were matters "for the Congress to consider" and held
that the ADEA did not apply extraterritorially.37 That court
and others reasoned that the FLSA's enforcement section,
section 213(f), which is indirectly incorporated into the ADEA,
reading "this title shall not apply.., to any employees.., in a
workplace within a foreign country" 8 mandated solely territo-
rial application of the ADEA.39 The court continued to reason
that when new legislation is enacted which incorporates provi-
sions of an existing law, Congress can be presumed to be cogni-
zant of the interpretation given to the prior law.4" Thus, the
which the exemption in section 213(f) of this title is applicable.
29 U.S.C § 216(d). The section 213(f) exemption provides that enumerated provi-
sions of "this title shall not apply with respect to any employees whose services
during the workweek are performed in a workplace in a foreign country." 29
U.S.C. § 213(f).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(M.
34. See Lopez v. Pan Am World Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 1118, 1119 (11th Cir.
1987); De Yoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir.
1986) (per curium); Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 558; Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d
1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 829
(10th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1257-63 (D. N.J.
1983), afld, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
35. 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 610 (quoting Cleary, 555 F. Supp. at 1263).
37. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 607.
38. 29 U.S.C. 213(f) (emphasis added).
39. Cleary, 555 F. Supp. at 1260; see also Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 555. It is
noteworthy that, in Pfeiffer, Chief Judge Posner questioned the chain of reasoning
and the "logical" incorporation of successive provisions to exclude extraterritorial
application. Id. at 556.
40. See Cleary, 555 F. Supp. at 1260 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
660 [Vol. XII:2
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court inferred that Congress was aware that the ADEA would
apply only nationally by incorporating (indirectly) section
213(f) of the FLSA. Accordingly, these courts refused to extend
the coverage of the ADEA to Americans employed overseas.
Courts, in refusing to extend application of the ADEA
beyond U.S. territory, have also rejected arguments that the
ADEA was substantively analogous to Title VII4' and should
therefore be given Title VII's extraterritorial application.'
Such courts reasoned Title VII was only given extraterritorial
application due to the inclusion of statutory language that was
absent in the ADEA.43 Moreover, Title VII lacked incorpora-
tion of the FLSA provision prescribing territorial application.
Accordingly, courts reasoned that the discrepancies between
the statutory language in both acts, with regard to both the
inclusion and omission of relevant statutory language, mandat-
ed the conclusion that Congress must have intended to apply
the ADEA only within the U.S. territory.
(1978)).
41. Title VII was held to have extraterritorial effect by some courts even prior
to its amendment. See, e.g., Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590,
592 (D. Md. 1986); Bryant v. Int'1. Sch. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 482-83 (D.
N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982); Love v. Pullman,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976), affd on other
grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978); cf EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 257-59 (1991) (holding that Title VII does not apply outside U.S.
territory absent clear legislative intent); EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 743 F.
Supp. 856, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that Title VII does not have extraterrito-
rial application), rev'd on other grounds, 939 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1991); Akgun v.
Boeing Co., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 140,011 at 62,911, 62,914 (W.D. Wa.
1990) (holding Title VII did not apply outside U.S. territory).
42. See Chris Lauderdale, Comment, 20 GA. J. INVL & COMP. L. 207, 210
(1992); Kathleen O'Brien, Note, Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc.: The Protections of the
ADEA Held Not to Apply to American Citizens Employed Abroad, 9 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 173, 186 (1983).
43. Title VII contains the so called "alien exemption" clause exempting em-
ployers with respect to the employment of aliens outside the United States: "This
subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of
aliens outside any State." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(A). Courts reasoned this phrase
compelled the negative inference that the act thus applies to American citizens
employed abroad. The analysis relied on reasoning that Congress must have in-
tended to extend the protection to Americans overseas since Congress explicitly
excluded aliens (and only aliens). For examples of applications and discussions of
this analysis see Akgun, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,011 at 62,913; Se-
ville, 638 F. Supp. at 592; Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 482; Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 482-83.
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III. AMENDMENT OF THE ADEA
A. Legislative Intent and History
In response to uncertainty and criticism regarding the
denial of extraterritorial application of the ADEA," Congress
exercised its power to extend its laws to the U.S. citizens em-
ployed overseas and amended the act by redefining the terms
"employee" and "employer."45 The term "employee" means
"any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed
by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country."6
By amending the act, Congress responded to the then
prevalent judicial reluctance to apply the act extraterritorially.
For instance, Senator Grassley, Chairman of the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources' Subcommittee on Aging, specifi-
cally addressed the denial of extraterritoriality by district
courts in Cleary v. United States Lines, 7 and Zahourek v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., during a hearing on age discrimination
overseas:
While I congratulate the judges for judicial restraint unchar-
acteristic of many of their colleagues, I cannot agree that
Congress would ever have intended either to leave out a
whole class of American employees or to leave such a large
loophole. Nonetheless I have drafted remedial legislation,
which I hope can be one subject of discussion today.
I want to take another moment here to address a mes-
sage to the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the 3d and 10th Dis-
tricts [sic], to whom the Cleary and Zahourek cases are on
appeal. I hope that those courts will not point to our activi-
ties today or to the introduction of legislation as an acknowl-
edgement that the lower courts reached the correct conclusion
as [to] congressional intent. It is nothing of the sort. Rather,
44. Courts and commentators, recognizing that the omission of a provision for
extraterritorial application in the ADEA left United States citizens working abroad
outside the protection of that law, began to criticize this lacuna in ADEA cover-
age. See Lauderdale, supra note 42, at 209. Furthermore, critics feared employers
would immunize themselves from liability by transferring a senior employee to an
overseas subsidiary and then discharging him. See, e.g., Cleary, 555 F. Supp. at
1263; see also Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559; O'rien, supra note 42, at 186.
45. Older American Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat.
1792 (1984) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630 (f)).
46. 29 U.S.C. 630(f).
47. 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1257-63 (D. N.J. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.
1984).
48. 750 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1984).
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this is an investigation as to whether further clarification of
congressional intent would be helpful in insuring the protec-
tion of thousands of American workers.
49
Additionally, Congress responded to concerns that the lack
of ADEA protection abroad gave employers an escape hatch.
Congress was troubled by the potential incentive for companies
to "ship & fire" their employees if the ADEA did not operate
extraterritorially. During the hearing, Senator Grassley quoted
from the Cleary court to contend that "deny[ing] extraterritori-
al effect to the age discrimination laws would invite an em-
ployer to transfer an older employee to a foreign subsidiary or
branch as a subterfuge and then terminate his services in
violation of the statute." ° Critics had the same troubling con-
cerns.5 Notwithstanding other commentators' contentions
that this concern was without merit since the EEOC's position
was that the act did apply extraterritorially,52 Congress none-
theless felt obliged to assure that companies were not present-
ed with such a loophole absent the amendment.53
The amendment to ensure extraterritorial reach of the
ADEA in response to case law holding the contrary unequivo-
cally dictates that Congress intended for U.S. citizens em-
ployed overseas to have a remedy when victimized by age dis-
crimination. The stated reason for the amendment is "to insure
that the citizens of the United States who are employed in a
foreign workplace by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries
enjoy the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act."5' The fact that Congress did not engage in debate over
49. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1983) (statement of senator Grassley). [hereinafter Hearings
on Age Discrimination Overseas].
50. Id. at 29-30.
51. See O'Brien, supra note 42, at 176.
52. See Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 119.
53. See Hearings on Age Discrimination Overseas, supra note 49, at 6. Clar-
ence Thomas, then Chairman of the EEOC, told the Subcommittee on Aging that:
"we do believe that if an employer intentionally transfers an employee to a foreign
operation for the purpose of evading the provisions of ADEA, we would consider
that kind of activity a violation of the Act as it is presently written." Id. The
EEOC's interpretation of the then-burrent provision was not controlling, but would
have been entitled to judicial deference.
54. Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3000.
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international issues when considering the legislation does not
negate its purpose."s
Moreover, Congress' subsequent amendments to the ADA
and Title VII55 in 1991, in response to some judiciary reluc-
tance to extend those acts' reach extraterritorially, manifest
Congressional intent to extend the protection of all employ-
ment discrimination laws to U.S. citizens employed over-
seas." Specifically, Congress accepted the U.S. Supreme
Court's invitation, made in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.,5" to amend Title VII" The stated purpose of the 1991
amendments to the ADA and Title VII is "to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of
relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate pro-
tection to victims of discrimination. "'° Congress remained
faithful to the spirit of anti-discrimination laws and amended
the acts, notwithstanding the contentions of critics of extrater-
ritorial application of civil rights provisions.61
55. When Congress contemplated international issues with regard to the
amendment they were more concerned with clearly limiting the application to U.S.
citizens only and with avoiding broad language that could be interpreted to in-
clude protection for foreign nationals: When considering this amendment, the Com-
mittee was cognizant of the well-established principle of sovereignty, that no na-
tion has the right to impose its labor standards on another country. That is why
the amendment is carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States
who are working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries. It does not apply to
foreign nationals working for such corporations in a foreign workplace and it does
not apply to foreign companies which are not controlled by U.S. firms. 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3000-01.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4)).
57. Note that these amendments extend the protection only to U.S. citizens
employed overseas by U.S. corporations. They do not extend to foreign nationals
employed by U.S. companies, nor to U.S. citizens employed by foreign companies.
See, e.g., Older American Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat.
1792 (1984) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630 (f)).
58. 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991).
59. The Supreme Court decided against extraterritoriality after analyzing the
arguments advanced by the EEOC. The Court was satisfied that Congress had
amended other statutes to provide for application overseas and "should it wish to
do so, may similarly amend Title VII." Id. at 259. The Court compared Title VII's
then-existing language to the already amended ADEA and its legislative history,
and noted Congress' explicit intent to apply ADEA abroad. Id. at 256. For a dis-
cussion of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. and the congressional response see
Ren~e Orleans, Extraterritorial Employment Protection Amendments of 1991: Con-
gress Protects U.S. Citizens Who Work for U.S. Companies Abroad, 16 MD. J. INTL
L. & TRADE 147, 152-159 (1992).
60. §3, 105 Stat. 1071.
61. See Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 126 (criticizing the 1984 amendment
664
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B. Exception to Extraterritorial Application-the "Foreign
Compulsion Defense"
The doctrine of foreign state compulsion allows a company
to escape liability for violations of the domestic law in its na-
tion of origin if the host country's law compelled the viola-
tion.62 The doctrine is based on equitable considerations for
defendants confronted with an obligation to abide by conflict-
ing laws." The defense originally arose in the U.S. courts as a
defense against extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws." The defense was not only recognized, but became fair-
ly well developed by the judiciary in both antitrust and subse-
quent Title VII cases.65 However, notwithstanding its ac-
knowledgment and development by U.S. courts, the defense
has been limited primarily to theory and dicta, and has en-
joyed minimal practical success.66 Consistent with and in def-
erence to international principles such as the act of state doc-
trine," international comity," and the "well-established
and predicting consequent political problems).
62. See ATWOOD & BREWSTER supra note 15, §§ 8.14-8.24 at 260-74; Warner,
supra note 15, at 375.
63. See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1298 (D. Del. 1970) (observing that if compulsion were not a defense to antitrust
enforcement, many U.S. firms would loose the ability to transact business in for-
eign lands); see also Warner, supra note 15, at 379-80.
64. See Warner, supra note 15, at 374; McGhee v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
871 F.2d 1412, 1419 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989); Interamerican Ref Corp., 307 F. Supp. at
1296-98; see also generally Pierre Vogelenzang, Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 131 (1980).
65. See Warner, supra note 15, at 374; see also infra Part III.B.1. Note that
prior to the amendment of Title VII to apply its provisions beyond U.S. territory,
it was only held to have such reach by some courts and the defense was devel-
oped as a theoretical analogy to its analogue in antitrust litigation.
66. See, e.g., Interamerican Ref. Corp., 307 F. Supp. at 1297-98.
67. The act of state doctrine is a "principle of law designed primarily to avoid
judicial inquiry into the acts and conduct of the officials of [a] foreign state, its
affairs and its policies and the underlying reasons, and motivations for the actions
of a foreign government." O.N.E. Shipping v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830
F.2d 449, 452 (2d. Cir. 1987). Courts have confused and commingled the act of
state and foreign compulsion doctrines. However, as one author notes, the two
doctrines have conceptually different justifications:
The foreign compulsion defense is distinct from the act of state doctrine
because the inability of an American court to inquire as to the validity of
[a] foreign governmental act does not in and of itself justify releasing a
private plaintiff from liability. Nothing in the act of state doctrine pre-
cludes a court from deciding to subject a private defendant to liability
and let the defendant choose which master to follow. The question that
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principles of sovereignty that no nation has the right to impose
its labor standards on another country,"69 Congress incorpo-
rated the foreign compulsion defense into ADEA's amendment
providing for its extraterritorial application. It was Congress'
stated intent "that [the ADEA's] amendment not be enforced
where compliance with its prohibitions would place a U.S.
company or its subsidiary in violation of the laws of the host
country."" The ADEA provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization- (1) to take any action otherwise pro-
hibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section...
where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would
cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such
employer, to violate the laws of the country in which such
workplace is located.7 1
When amended to apply extraterritorially, the ADA and
Title VII adopted substantially similar language to the ADEA
to provide for the foreign compulsion defense. For instance,
Title VII provides:
It shall not be unlawful... for an employer (or a corporation
controlled by an employer), labor organization, employment
agency.., to take any action otherwise prohibited by such
section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a for-
eign country if compliance with such section would cause
such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such
agency, or such committee to violate the law of the foreign
country in which such a workplace is located.72
The ADA provides:
the court must ask in a foreign compulsion analysis is whether the al-
leged compulsion, valid or invalid, actually occurred.
Warner, supra note 15, at 380.
68. Comity refers to the mutual respect sovereigns extend to each others' laws
out of courtesy. See LOUIS HENMN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 3 (1987).
69. Zimmerman supra note 17, at 107.
70. Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3001.
71. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
(1994).
72. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b) (1994 & Supp. I).
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It shall not be unlawful under this section for a covered enti-
ty to take any action that constitutes discrimination under
this section with respect to an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country if compliance with this section would cause
such covered entity to violate the law of the foreign country
in which such workplace is located. 3
With regard to the extraterritorial application of all U.S.
laws, in 1986 the RESTATEMENT was redrafted to include a
version of the foreign state compulsion doctrine:
(1) In general, a state may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by
the law of that state or by the law of the state of which
he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is
required by the law of that state or by the law of the
state of which he is a national.
(2) In general, a state may require a person of foreign nation-
ality
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by
the law of the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even if it is
required by the law of the state of which he is a nation-
al.74
The RESTATEMENT version predated both Title Virs and the
ADA's amendment, but antedated ADEA's. Thus, endorsement
of the same defense by the American Law Institute, and subse-
quent enactments of the same defense by Congress with regard
to the remaining employment discrimination laws, evidences
Congress' acceptance of the defense and its limitation.
1. Narrow Construction and Actual Compulsion Requirement
of the Defense
As a remedial measure, the language of employment pro-
tection acts are to be construed as to effectuate their purpos-
es.75 All exceptions to employment discrimination laws are
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(1).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 441 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
75. See H.R. REP. No. 102-83, Sec. 109 at 20 (1991). "Sec. 1007. Rules of
1997]
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limited and are to be construed narrowly,76 as the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification 77 (BFOQ) defense has been.78 Pri-
or to 1984, the foreign compulsion defense was utilized primar-
ily in antitrust cases.79 In these cases, the defense was con-
strued very narrowly, requiring an official government man-
date, and was largely unsuccessful. "In the context of antitrust
law courts have held that knowledge, acquiescence, approval,
or even encouragement of the illegal activity by the host gov-
ernment does not excuse an antitrust violation."0 Notwith-
standing the substantive differences between antitrust and
Construction for Civil Rights Laws. (a) Effectuation of Purpose: - All Federal
laws protecting the civil rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the
intent of such laws, and shall be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of
such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide effective remedies." Id.
76. 'The ADEA is a remedial statute and exceptions to it are to be construed
narrowly." Mahoney v. RFERL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47
F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
77. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) Defense permits discrim-
ination when a particular attribute of an employee is a requisite to perform the
job effectively. For instance, the ADEA provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer ....
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under the subsections (a), (b),
(c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age ....
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994). The
Americans with Disabilities Act provides:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that
an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection crite-
ria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or
benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-relat-
ed and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot
be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this
chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). Title VII provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, ... it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees . . . on the basis of. . . religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
78. "The defense has properly been construed by the cases as a narrow excep-
tion in order to avoid the situation where the exception swallows the rule." Kern
v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (N.D. Tex. 1983). For an example
of the application of the defense see infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
79. See Lauderdale, supra note 42, at 214; Warner, supra note 15, at 374.
80. See id. at 375.
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employment discrimination, the construction of the foreign
compulsion defense in antitrust cases is sufficiently analogous,
since the defense, in any extraterritorial provision, has an
independent meaning irrespective of the act to which it atta-
ches.
Additionally, the RESTATEMENT advocates a strict and nar-
row interpretation of the defense. For instance, it requires the
imposition of severe sanctions, and compulsion in the form of
binding law in order to invoke the defense successfully.8 A
comment following the RESTATEMENT's formulation of the for-
eign state compulsion doctrine sets forth its parameters:
The defense of foreign government compulsion is in general
available only when the other state's requirements are em-
bodied in binding laws or regulations subject to penal or
other severe sanction; it is not available when the second
state's orders are given in the form of "guidance," informal
communications, or the like. 2
In conformity with a narrow construction, case law has
drawn a distinction between mandatory foreign law, and mere
foreign practice and custom, where the latter do not suffice for
the defense.' Additionally, the EEOC contends that a funda-
mental difference exists between a host country's customs and
practices, and a host country's statutory mandates." In
Bryant v. International School Services, Inc.,' the court did
not even ascertain whether the violative conduct constituted
tradition, custom or policy, since none would be of any conse-
quence to the defense.86
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 441 cmt. c.
82. Id.
83. See infra note 88.
84. See EEOC, EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE NOTICE 915.046, ANALYSIS OF
§ 4(F)(1) "FOREIGN LAWS" DEFENSE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
OF 1967, (Dec. 5, 1989), reprinted in EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 6524 at 5121-22
(1995) [hereinafter EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE NOTICE 915.046]. The foreign compul-
sion defense applies only where compliance with U.S. discrimination laws will lead
to a violation of foreign law. Moreover, the company asserting the defense will
have to show an authoritative and factual basis and cannot rely on conjecture for
the proposition that the conduct was compelled by the host country's government.
See Host Country Bars Hiring of Women in Foreign Job, EEOC Dec. No. 85-10,
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6850, 7052 at 7054-55 (July 16, 1985).
85. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D. N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d
Cir. 1982).
86. See id. at 490-91. The Bryant court wrote that "[tihose were actions and
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The foreign compulsion defense requires the employer to
prove that an order by the foreign government actually com-
pelled the U.S. business to violate U.S. law." Mere govern-
mental participation is insufficient. The foreign law must have
coerced the defendant into violating U.S. law: "[t]he defense is
not available if the defendant could have legally refused to
accede to the foreign power's wishes."' Traditionally, the de-
fense has required an official government mandate. Moreover,
the employer must prove that noncompliance with the local
law would subject them to severe penalties." Although what
losses qualify as severe penalties are still somewhat specula-
tive, several commentators suggest that mere civil liability or
potential loss of a customer would not suffice."
Courts have confined the defense's invocation to instances
where the violation of U.S. law was compelled by the law of a
host country. An exception would be instances where the com-
policies of Ifnternationall S[chool] S[ervices] and neither reflected sovereign deci-
sions of the Iranian government, nor were compelled by the Iranian government.
Thus those actions and policies are not protected by... the defense of foreign
compulsion." Id.
87. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d
Cir. 1979); see also Warner, supra note 15, at 375. The compulsion by the govern-
ment is a difficult threshold to pass. It is important to note, however, that several
other factors may come into play which are conceptually distinct from this defense.
Specifically, while some activity may not elevate governmental participation to the
level of compulsion, the same activity may be relevant on the issue of whether
extraterritoriality of this law is reasonable. This necessarily turns on whether the
laws explicitly provide for extraterritoriality, as the reasonableness test is a com-
mon law doctrine applied to assist in determining whether a U.S. law should
apply overseas. In addition, the control test may serve to limit extraterritoriality.
For the employment discrimination acts to extend, the company or subsidiary
whose conduct overseas is being challenged, must be under U.S. control which is
determined by a four prong test. Also, the BFOQ defense can be utilized. Doctrin-
ally, the BFOQ defense is distinct from the foreign compulsion defense. However,
circumstances can be manipulated and where foreign compulsion defense fails,
BFOQ defense may prevail. See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text; see
also Abrams v. Baylor College of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1986).
88. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293.
89. See Gladstone, supra note 5, at 12.
90. See id.; Mark R. Azman, The Development of Title WI Protection for Amer-
ican Citizens Employed Abroad by American Employers: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 18 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 531, 547 (1992). But see United States v.
First Nal City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) (expressing in dicta
the court's reluctance, in light of principle of international comity, "to hold ...
that the mere absence of criminal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates obedience
to a subpoena" where compliance with subpoena would subject U.S. bank to civil
liability under German law).
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pulsion, although not a formal law, was construed as stemming
from an act of state. For instance, in Interamerican Ref. Corp.
v. Texas Maracaibo,9 the defense was properly invoked
against enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws by Texas Maracaibo
and other defendants where those companies had been com-
pelled by regulatory authorities in Venezuela to boycott
Interamerican Refining. 2 The court reasoned that the boycott
was compelled by the host government and thus was within
the scope of the foreign compulsion defense." More often,
however, the defense has been accepted in theory and dicta but
has failed when invoked.
A sharp and crucial distinction exists between governmen-
tal approval or even participation in private conduct and gov-
ernmental compulsion, and only the latter suffices for the de-
fense. Governmental guidelines do not even rise to the level of
law for a proper invocation of the foreign compulsion de-
fense.94 Since noncompliance with mere guidelines does not
impose severe penalties or severely impede the continuation of
business activity, guidelines by themselves cannot be construed
to constitute law for purposes of this defense.
Activity that is tolerated, licensed, or even participated in
by the foreign government is not sufficient, as such activity is
not required by the foreign state.95 Instances of governmental
tolerance often arise where a government approves or even
directs a certain private arrangement.96 Nonetheless, condon-
ing or enforcing an activity or a contract does not equate the
activity or contract with law, since these types of private ar-
rangements are not compelled by the laws of the host state. 7
91. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
92. See id. at 1297.
93. See id. at 1298-99 (ultimately holding that the court was barred by the
act of state doctrine from inquiring as to whether or not Venezuelan regulatory
agency had legal authority for acts compelling U.S. companies to participate in
boycott).
94. See Azman, supra note 90, at 546-47; Gladstone, supra note 5, at 11-12.
95. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 441 cmt. d (1986); see also U.S. v.
Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Ctr, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCI-) 70,600 at
77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (finding that Swiss governmental approval of agreement
to hinder and prevent the development of competitive watch industries did not
amount to a government mandate), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
96. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 441 cmt. d.
97. See EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE NOTICE 915.046, supra note 84; Mannington
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Additionally, knowledge, acquiescence, or even encouragement
of illegal activity by a host government will not excuse a viola-
tion."
On the other hand, the existence of a foreign authoritative
directive does not necessarily support the defense. In McGhee
v. Arabian American Oil Co.,99 a specific directive by a Saudi
authority was not held sufficient to invoke the defense, as the
company could have taken measures to avoid or mitigate the
sovereign's orders."' Similarly, in Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v.
Taca Int'l Airlines, °'0 a corporation under the laws of El Sal-
vador, was not exempted from liability for a violation of the
Railway Labor Act by relocating its pilot base from the U.S. to
El Salvador, although it was pursuant to a directive of the
Salvadoran Ministry of Labor who relied on El Salvador's new
constitution.0 2
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1979) (mere issu-
ance of patents by a foreign government is not foreign government compulsion).
Furthermore, as the district court in Mahoney correctly found, "[ilf overseas em-
ployers could avoid application of the ADEA simply by embedding an age-discrimi-
natory provision in a contract, having a foreign court enforce the contract, and
calling the court's decision 'law', then the Act's extraterritorial provisions would be
largely nullified, for employers could easily contract around the law." Mahoney v.
RFE/RL Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995). Thus, such an analysis would have been
catastrophic and could have essentially eliminated any extraterritorial application.
Although fortunately the court did not adopt this court enforcement type of analy-
sis, the one employed is equally inappropriate and devoid of historical and textual
support.
98. See Warner, supra note 15, at 375.
99. 871 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1989).
100. See id. at 1419-20. In McGhee two U.S. employees were discharged under
their employment contract executed in the U.S. which incorporated Saudi Labor
Law, including a prohibition against discharge unless a valid reason can be shown.
The employees began renting and selling videos from their homes which violated
Saudi law prohibiting engagement of commercial activity without a license. Gener-
al Othman, the Chief of Police of the Eastern Province, agreed to let the officials
of the company (Aramco) handle the matter provided the employees were terminat-
ed. Id. at 1415. The court noted that notwithstanding plaintiffs' concession that
they violated Saudi law against unlicensed business, such violation does not neces-
sarily provide a "valid reason" for termination as provided in the contract. More-
over, the foreign compulsion defense is not normally implicated in international
contract disputes especially where the dispute is governed by that sovereign's do-
mestic law. See id. at 1419.
101. 748 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1984).
102. See id. at 965. Article 110 4 of the El Salvadoran constitution provides
in pertinent part: "Salvadoran public services companies will have their work cen-
ter and base of operation in El Salvador." Id. at 968.
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Similarly, the RESTATEMENT unequivocally rejects contrac-
tual agreements from falling within the scope of the defense. A
comment to the RESTATEMENT's foreign state compulsion
makes it clear that participation by foreign governments in
"essentially private arrangements" will not invoke the defense
of foreign state compulsion. °3 Further, at least one court re-
fused to entertain the assertion of the foreign compulsion de-
fense in a contract dispute." 4
Additionally, the RESTATEMENT requires the imposition of
severe sanctions in order to categorize a government directive
as law.0 5 As a RESTATEMENT comment explains, "an order of
state X to its nationals to discriminate on the basis of race,
sex, or religion... would not be a good defense to a charge of
unlawful discrimination under United States law."0 6 Howev-
er, if a company in state X were able to prove that conformity
with U.S. law would be a crime in state X, that company gen-
erally would have a good defense.' v
Furthermore, the government decree must result from the
law of the host country. The lack of Congressional debate re-
garding the construction of the defense, specifically the phrase
"to violate the law of the foreign country," does not abrogate
Congressional intent to utilize foreign law for the construction
of the defense.0 8 Indeed, such intent is manifest by the act's
plain language. The fact that Congress did not contemplate
international implications while amending employment dis-
crimination acts to apply extraterritorially, °9 suggests an in-
103. RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 441 cmt. d.
104. See McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) ("the purposes of foreign
compulsion doctrine normally are not implicated in cases involving international
contract disputes").
105. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 441 cmts. c and b.
106. Id. § 441 cmt. b (1986) (emphasis added).
107. See id& While the RESTATEMENT relies on the severity of the sanction to
determine if the defense should apply, such severity relates only to the host
country's law and not to the first state's law. As the RESTATEMENT explains, the
limitations on the foreign state compulsion defense apply "whether the requirement
or prohibition by the first state is backed by criminal or civil liability or both." Id.
§ 441 cmt. c.
108. Section 109 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intended to make it "clear
that employers are not required [by Title VII or the ADEA] to take actions other-
wise prohibited by law in a foreign place of business." 137 CONG. REc. 9547 (1991)
(Hyde Memorandum).
109. See Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
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tention to protect employers against only compulsion by foreign
law and thereby to reconcile the extraterritorial ramifications
of U.S. employment law with international principles of comity
and sovereignty. An alternative reading of the act, for instance
that U.S. law falls within the scope of "the law of the foreign
country" would necessarily infringe upon other nations' sover-
eignty. It is difficult to envision Congress failing to discuss
such an implication. A reasonable interpretation of the act, in
light of the absence of legislative discussion regarding the
application of the foreign compulsion defense and in light of
the plain language of the act, is that Congress intended the
foreign law compulsion defense to extend to, and include only,
the law of the host country."0
2. Foreign Compulsion Defense in Past Employment
Discrimination Cases
The defense in the employment discrimination arena has
been applied inconsistently,"' but generally has been con-
strued narrowly as well." The defense has been applied in a
limited number of circumstances and has not enjoyed much
success. In the few cases where the defense precluded liability,
the conduct was compelled by an actual law backed with sub-
stantial penalties. For instance, the EEOC held that an em-
ployer did not violate Title VII where the laws of the host
country forbade the employer from hiring an otherwise quali-
fied woman for a position as an air traffic controller. The posi-
tion required contact with men, which was prohibited by that
country's law."'
1984 U.S.C.CAIN. 3000, 3001, 3037.
110. Representative Stenholm, for instance, expressed concern that the legisla-
ture was enacting a bill that had not adequately been discussed and pointed spe-
cifically to the issue of extraterritorial coverage. See 137 CONG. REC. 3945 (1991)
(statement of Rep. Stenholm).
111. See Warner, supra note 15, at 389.
112. See Lauderdale, supra note 42, at 207, 216.
113. See Host Country Bars Hiring of Women in Foreign Job, EEOC Dec. No.
85-10, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6850, 7052 at 7054 (July 16, 1985). As this
decision explained:
The host country's laws restricting the employment opportunities of wom-
en are strictly enforced. An official letter of the host country emphasizes
that private companies will not be permitted to disregard the laws
against the commingling of the sexes and instructs certain of that
country's ministers to investigate all private companies employing women.
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However, in most employment cases, the defense did not
prove to be a useful resource for defendants."4 The defense
was not permitted, for instance, to bar liability where the con-
duct could not be categorized as actual law. For instance, in
Bryant v. International School Services, Inc.,"5 the local hire
contract for teachers whose spouses were employed in Iran
received less favorable treatment than the International School
Services sponsored contract."' The foreign compulsion de-
fense was not useful since neither the local hire contract itself,
nor the act of concealing the differences between the two types
of contracts, were mandated by the Iranian government."7
Even if a woman is issued a work permit, the host country may still
deport her and her employer for violating those laws.
Id. It is important to note that this decision was written prior to the amendment
providing for extraterritorial application, and prior to the codification of the foreign
compulsion defense as it pertains to Title VII. The EEOC, at that time, adopted a
good faith approach to the foreign compulsion defense, where the company assert-
ing the defense had to establish, with evidence, a good faith reliance on a govern-
ment order. For a good discussion on the benefits of utilizing a good faith ap-
proach to the foreign compulsion defense, see Warner, supra note 15, at 385-86.
114. This is illustrated by Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 555
(7th Cir. 1985), where two U.S. citizens were terminated at age 65 in Germany.
Although counsel for the plaintiffs had acknowledged the existence of a German
"law" requiring retirement at age 65, the court refused to place great weight on
what the court considered could have been an "unguarded and possibly inaccurate
statement." Id. at 557. It is quite significant to the Pfeiffer case that the court
was not at all convinced that such a law existed. They were very careful to artic-
ulate a distinction between custom and law, particularly for purposes of this de-
fense. Such a distinction is consistent with the foreign compulsion defense both as
it existed prior and subsequent to its codification in the 1984 amendment. Note,
however, that the court was not required to resolve these difficult issues since its
unwillingness td apply the amendment retroactively warranted a dismissal of the
allegation. Indeed, although not required to, the Pfeiffer court found that the de-
fendant had produced no evidence to prove the existence of such a law. Ultimately
the court based its conclusion that plaintiff lacked a cause of action under the
ADEA on the general policy against extending the reach of U.S. laws beyond U.S.
territory absent clear congressional authorization. The court recognized, though,
that a cause of action would have existed if a company transferred older employ-
ees abroad as a pretext for terminating them. See id. at 559.
115. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D. N.J. 1980) rev'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 562, 565
(3d Cir. 1982).
116. See id. at 474.
117. See id. at 491. International School Services (ISS) asserted that the Irani-
an government required that there be no payment of double benefits. Double bene-
fits would occur by applying the ISS-sponsored contract instead of the local hire
contract to married teachers, as in that situation both spouses would be receiving
benefits. However, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the differ-
ent contracts were a violation of Title VII, and thus, unnecessary to analyze a
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The court in Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine.8
found a Title VII violation where a medical school denied par-
ticipation by two Jewish applicants on the basis of their reli-
gion. Since the College could not prove the official position of
the Saudi authorities was to forbid participation of Jews, the
defense failed."'
Where liability was exempted, the court relied on the
BFOQ defense, not on foreign state compulsion. 2 ' The BFOQ
defense permits employers to discharge or hire an individual
due to certain attributes when either the existence of, or lack
of, that attribute is necessary to perform professional duties
adequately.'2 In Kern v. Dynalectron Corp.,"'2 the BFOQ
defense was applied to exempt a U.S. subsidiary in Saudi Ara-
bia from liability for religious discrimination against helicopter
pilots in a unique employment context: "Dynalectron has prov-
en a factual basis for believing that all non-Moslems would be
unable to perform this job safely. Specifically, non-Moslems
flying into Mecca are, if caught, beheaded."" The court held
that Saudi law compelled the discriminatory conduct and that
hiring Moslems was not merely a company preference, but was
an attribute employees must have in order to perform their job
safely.
IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MAHONEY V.
RFE/RL, INC.
Although cases subsequent to the 1984 amendment of the
ADEA providing for extraterritoriality thus far have not ap-
plied the ADEA extraterritorially, the only rationale for doing
foreign compulsion defense. Instead, the court found the Title VII violation oc-
curred when the company failed to advise the employees hired locally of its basis
for awarding contracts and by determining the employees' primary purpose for re-
maining in Iran by using criteria which discriminated against married women. See
id. at 490. The court found that nothing in this arrangement was compelled by
the Iranian government and that the foreign compulsion defense was not applica-
ble. See id. at 491.
118. 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
119. See id. at 535 (discussing the factual findings of the district court).
120. See, e.g., Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (N.D. Tex.
1983) affd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
121. Id. at 1199.
122. 577 F. Supp. at 1196.
123. Id. at 1200.
124. See id.
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so was their refusal to apply the amendment retroactively.
Since the amendment, courts have only had occasion to consid-
er the extraterritorial application with regard to conduct giving
rise to a cause of action which occurred prior to the amend-
ment. Thus, such courts adhered to the well-settled principle
against declaring conduct illegal which was perfectly within
the confines of the law while it was performed. Absent retroac-
tive application, these courts had no alternative but to pre-
scribe the rule which existed prior to the amendment. They
consequently adopted the FLSA analysis, excluded foreign
workplaces from coverage and denied extraterritorial
reach."
Mahoney v. RFE/RL"2s is the first occasion courts have
had to apply the amendment to a cause of action arising after
1984. A determination regarding extraterritoriality is unneces-
sary since the act clearly extends the protection overseas. Cur-
rently, the only issue before the courts is the scope of the
amendment and the statutory interpretation of certain terms.
Specifically, courts must determine what constitutes a "law of
a foreign country" to afford an element of predictability and
precision to the foreign compulsion defense.
In Mahoney, U.S. citizens were required to retire at age
sixty-five from their positions at RFE/RL, a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Munich, Germany,
under a contract executed in Germany. 27 RFE/RL applied to
the Works Council' to exempt the U.S. citizens from the
125. See Lopez v. Pan Am World Svcs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1118, 1119-20 (11th Cir.
1987) (discussing a possible exception where ADEA could be applied to situations
where employer transferred employees abroad for purpose of avoiding the act's
coverage); S.F. De Yoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 555-56, 558
(7th Cir. 1985); Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Thomas v. Brown & Root, 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984); Zahourek v. Arthur
Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1984); Belanger v. Keydril Co., 595
F. Supp. 823, 824-25 (E.D. La. 1984), affd, 772 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 861, 863-64 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
126. 818 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
127. See id. at 3.
128. Betriebsrat or "Works Councils" are bodies in all German companies that
have at least twenty workers. These councils are elected by unionized and
nonunionized employees and must approve departures from contractual agreements.
They are private rather than governmental entities. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.,
47 F.3d 447-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995). See also NORBERT
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agreement. The Works Council determined that the U.S. citi-
zens had to retire pursuant to the labor contract. The company
appealed Works Council's decision to the Munich Labor Court
and lost. That court held that an exemption for U.S. employees
would unfairly discriminate against Germans and that retain-
ing them despite the agreement would'be illegal." 9
The EEOC evaluated the case and opined that no defense
precluded RFE/RL's liability. Accordingly, they brought suit in
the U.S. on the Americans' behalf. The district court granted a
partial motion for summary judgment for the plaintiffs, deny-
ing the invocation of the foreign compulsion defense.13° The
court reasoned this was a contract binding only its parties and
it had no broad application. Further, they held the agreement
was between two private entities and it had not been mandat-
ed by the German government in any way. 1' Additionally,
the court rejected defendant's argument that German labor
policy and practice calling for a mandatory retirement age of
sixty-five, notwithstanding its frequency and strength, consti-
tute law.'32 Most importantly, the court distinguished be-
tween a law per se and an enforceable provision in a contract.
Referring to Professor Simitis, an expert witness for the defen-
dant, the district court wrote:
Professor Simitis testified that the mandatory retirement
provision in the union contract had "legal" force in Germany
in the sense that it was legally binding. That is precisely the
sense in which such contracts in this country may be said to
have "legal force; yet they are not ordinarily thought of as
"laws . ,
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the agreement
was "foreign law" and reversed. The court reasoned that since
the U.S. Supreme Court held a collective bargaining agreement
equated law for purposes of a rail carrier's exemption,'34 fail-
HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMIERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 319-20
(Tony Weir, trans., 1982).
129. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448.
130. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d
447 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
131. See id. at 3.
132. See id. at 3-4.
133. Id. at 3.
134. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117,
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ure to comply with this labor contract was a violation of law.
While the court mentions the Munich Labor Court decision, it
did not rely on it as the basis for its conclusion. Stated differ-
ently, the court did not conclude that the Munich Labor
Court's enforcement of the agreement elevated it to "law;"
rather, the determination that the collective bargaining agree-
ment was law was based on a U.S. case. The instant case was
denied review by the U.S. Supreme Court."3 5
V. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Misplaced Analysis
Reliance on U.S. precedent in a factually distinguishable
case that had exclusively territorial application was not only
misplaced but also improper. Whether a collective bargaining
agreement is law in the U.S. is not the relevant inquiry; rath-
er, the issue is whether a collective bargaining agreement is
law in Germany. Further, the analysis should proceed to in-
quire whether the so-called "law" rises to the level of an official
government mandate. Moreover, not only did the Court of
Appeals err in relying on domestic precedent, but the court
also misconstrued the case upon which it relied.
The Court of Appeals based its conclusion that a collective
bargaining agreement was law on the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American Train
Dispatchers' Ass'n. ' 6 Norfolk & Western, however, is easily
distinguishable from the situation that confronted the
Mahoney court. The "all other law" provision of the act in Nor-
folk & Western was read to include a collective bargaining
agreement only for a very narrow and exceptional purpose. In
response to economic and social considerations, and in an effort
129 (1991) (holding that language in 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a), making rail carrier
consolidations approved by Interstate Commerce Commission exempt from "anti-
trust laws and from all other law" as necessary to carry out such consolidation,
encompasses "carrier's legal obligations under a collective-bargaining agreement").
135. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL Inc., 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
136. 499 U.S. 117 (1991). At no time did the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFEIRL) cite Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. to support its contention. Nonetheless, the
Court of Appeals concluded that "[ilf Norfolk & Western had been brought to the
district court's attention, we have no doubt that it would have ruled the other
way." Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 449. The court itself acknowledged that neither party
ever raised this case in oral argument nor in any memoranda of law.
1997] 679
BROOK. J. INTL L.
to promote the welfare of the industry, Congress attempted to
encourage railroad carrier consolidations.137 Thus, once the
International Commerce Commission (ICC) approves the con-
solidation, a carrier "is exempt from the antitrust laws and
from all other law, including State and municipal law, as nec-
essary to let [the] carrier... carry out the transaction." 8'
The Court read the phrase "all other law" to encompass a col-
lective bargaining agreement. 39 However, a collective bar-
gaining agreement was only considered within the definition of
law "when necessary to carry out an ICC-approved transac-
tion."40 Indeed, the six times the Court states that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement falls within the scope of "all other
law", the Court carefully concludes with this qualification,
which is precisely how the statute read. The Court did not hold
that a collective bargaining agreement will always be elevated
to the level of law, even within the United States. The Court's
holding merely assured Congressional intent to eliminate im-
pediments to the completion of the ICC-approved consolidation
transaction. Indeed, allowing a collective bargaining agreement
to impede the transaction where a law could not, would be a
holding defying common sense. Moreover, the Court refers to a
collective bargaining agreement's contractual feel, and notes it
is only binding on the parties and does not have the wide-
spread application that law does. Therefore, reading Norfolk &
Western as a conclusive determination that a collective bar-
gaining agreement constitutes law in all contexts is incorrect.
Had the Court of Appeals read this case in its proper context,
it would have been obliged to interpret the act in a manner
that would implement Congressional purpose.
Moreover, resorting to domestic precedent for a determina-
tion of whether a collective bargaining agreement was law in
Germany was not proper. The accurate inquiry is whether a
137. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 499 U.S. at 119.
138. 49 U.S.C. § 11321(a) (1994) (formerly 49 U.S.C. 11341) (emphasis added).
139. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 499 U.S. at 129. It is noteworthy that Justice
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion with whom Justice Marshall joined where they
felt it was a "rather remarkable assumption" to include as law "the restraints
created by private contract." Id. at 138-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He continued
by stating "[hiad Congress intended to convey the message the Court finds in
§ 11341, it surely would have said expressly that the exemption was from all
restraints imposed by law or by private contract." Id. at 138-39.
140. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 499 U.S. at 119.
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collective bargaining agreement is law in Germany, as the act
reads the violation shall not be unlawful where compliance
"would cause such employer.., to violate the laws of the coun-
try in which such workplace is located." In fact, using U.S.
law to define what is considered law abroad is wholly inap-
posite and negates the act. As a result of this holding, U.S.
companies overseas are invited to research U.S. case law to
find an instance where nontraditional law was considered law
for purposes of one act (even in a completely factually distin-
guishable case) and allege that it has been conclusively defined
as law.
Such a scenario permits the foreign compulsion defense to
eviscerate the extraterritorial application. Additionally, by
using U.S. law to make a determination about German law,
the court imposes U.S. standards on Germany, implying that
U.S. law is superior. Such an analysis may infringe upon the
sovereignty of other nations, and may ultimately create inter-
national political problems.
If, in the alternative, the Court of Appeals had relied on
the Munich Labor Court decision to conclude that the collective
bargaining agreement was law, that analysis nonetheless
would not have exempted RFE/RL's liability. However, such an
analysis would have more support, as the text of the act in-
vites such an inquiry. Ultimately, the court would likely have
ascertained that the Munich Labor Court only approved and
enforced an agreement. As the Ninth Circuit determined in
Timberlane v. Bank of America,' "[riere governmental ap-
proval or foreign governmental involvement which defendants
had arranged does not necessarily provide a defense."' The
EEOC contends that such a court order is not a German law,
and thus should not be relied on as a defense.' As in the
United States, courts can enforce any agreement at which time
it is considered enforceable, yet is not deemed to be law in the
same sense that legislation with general application is. More-
over, as a civil law country, court decisions in Germany do not
141. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994) (emphasis added).
142. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
143. Id. at 606.
144. See Joy Cherian, Current Development in Transnational Employment
Rights, 40 LAB. L.J. 259, 261 (1989).
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have a stare decisis effect. The German court was thus "doing
no more than applying the law when it makes a decision, the
decision itself can have no force as law beyond the very case in
which it is rendered."145
B. Proper Determination of Law
If the circuit court in Mahoney had inquired into whether
the agreement at issue was law in Germany, the court would
have discovered the mandatory retirement age is not part of
German law and that neither is the collective bargaining
agreement. The trial court did attempt to ascertain the rele-
vant German law and the inquiry was overlooked, and thus
rejected, upon review.
During oral argument on cross motions for summary judg-.
ment, the district court scrutinized the German labor law and
the role of collective bargaining agreements. 46 The judge con-
cluded the mandatory retirement age was policy, and a collec-
tive bargaining agreement was merely a legally enforceable
contract. 47 The defendant, RFE/RL, informed the court that
their expert witness had testified that "the collective bargain-
ing agreement has the same force and effect as the stat-
ute."1' The plaintiff contended that the expert witness had
testified that "there was no legislation in Germany whatsoever
that would require mandatory retirement for employees of
private companies" and that "he indeed testified to some legis-
lation recently enacted, which he identified in his deposition,
that would put an end to mandatory retirement in employment
contracts."149 Furthermore, although the Munich Labor Court
enforced the contract, that court did not rely on any legislation
mandating a retirement age of sixty-five in Germany.5 0 The
district court judge clarified the use of the term "legislation" to
mean an act of parliament or any other level. That early retire-
ment is social policy in Germany is of no consequence.'51
145. HORN ET AL., supra note 128, at 11.
146. See Lairold Street, Extraterritoriality: Conflict of Laws, 9 N.B.A. MAG. 16,
17 (1995) (excerpting oral argument on parties' cross motions for summary judg-
ment).
147. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1992), reu'd, 47
F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
148. Street, supra note 146, at 17.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. The judge distinguished between formal laws and merely material
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In interpreting the foreign compulsion defense, the district
court in Mahoney clarified the distinction between law and
practice:
[allthough there appears to be no authority directly on point,
it is difficult to imagine that Congress intended the term
'laws' to extend beyond its ordinary meaning to encompass
practices, policies and contracts. Congress knows how to
address the 'policies or practices' of foreign governments, as it
has done expressly in legislation condemning such discrimi-
nation in the context of arms trading. 22 U.S.C. § 2755(a) &
(b)(1). The foreign laws exception of § 623(f)(1), in contrast,
applies only where another country's laws would be violated
by compliance with the ADEA.'11
The district court concluded that the mandatory retire-
ment age of sixty-five was policy, under which a contract hav-
ing legal force was made, but that neither policy nor contract
were law. The court illuminated its distinction by pointing out
that the mandatory retirement age "provision does not have
general application, as laws normally do" and that, moreover,
"[piractices and policies, even when embodied in contracts, are
not 'laws.""'5
Additionally, although the court was never required to
resolve the issue, in Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co.,154 Chief
Judge Posner addressed whether a mandatory retirement age
of sixty-five in Germany constituted law and expressed doubt
that it was.'55 Despite the fact that the German government
pursues a more active role in labor negotiations than the U.S.
government, 5 ' involvement does not elevate the agreement
laws, concluding that "[a] formal law is a law enacted by a parliament; that is
either by the federal parliament or by one parliament of the 16 states. Merely
material laws are norms not enacted by parliament." Id.
152. Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 47 F.3d
447, 450 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
153. Id.
154. 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
155. See id. at 557 (summarily denying extraterritorial application of the ADEA
on the ground that retroactive application to conduct occurring prior to the amend-
ment would be inappropriate). It is noteworthy that the issue in that case was
identical to Mahoney and that although there was no reason to inquire into the
state of German law then due to the summary denial, Posner nonetheless recog-
nized such an inquiry's relevance.
156. See Lauderdale, supra note 42, at 219.
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to the level of law.
Consequently, the analysis employed by the Court of Ap-
peals was incorrect. Moreover, had the proper inquiries been
made, the court would not have found any German law man-
dating a sixty-five year old retirement age, nor legislation
equating a collective bargaining agreement with law.
C. Deviation from Past Application
Such a broad interpretation of the defense is an evasion
from established precedent. Equating a collective bargaining
agreement-perhaps more appropriately referred to as a labor
contract-with law is inconsistent with the traditionally nar-
row interpretation of foreign law. The instant case is distin-
guishable from both Kern and the EEOC decision, where the
defense was employed successfully. Both of those cases in-
volved conduct mandated by foreign laws, not a mere labor
agreement.'57 Moreover, as the conduct in question there was
illegal, severe penalties and/or sanctions would have been
imposed, where here, the only likely negative consequence
RFE/RL would endure is a civil suit or the imposition of fines
by the EEOC.'58
Furthermore, the departure from precedent is more mani-
fest in this case. Not only does this case hold that a collective
bargaining agreement constitutes law based on domestic appli-
cation of U.S. common law, but the court holds that a mere
agreement enforced by a court rises to the level of an official
government mandate by a foreign government. Indeed, even
directives by Saudi and El Salvadoran officials were not given
such effect.'59
The Mahoney decision occasions a lack of predictability in
judicial understanding of a defense with increasingly wide-
spread application and will create uncertainty for both employ-
ers and employees. It may ultimately prevent employees from
accepting opportunities overseas for fear of being victims of
immune discrimination, including discharge. Moreover, a
vague and inconsistent interpretation may cause certain
157. See supra Part III.B.2. However, arguably, the Kern court relied on the
BFOQ defense and not on foreign state compulsion.
158. See Lauderdale, supra note 42, at 219.
159. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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countries' corporations to believe they are victims of disparate
treatment and may create international political problems.
D. Danger in Future Application: Congressional Intent
Undermined
Congress was already forced to return to the drawing
board and respond to the judiciary by expressly providing for
extraterritorial application of employment discrimination acts.
Unequivocally, Congress intends to extend employment dis-
crimination protection. In amending Title VII and the ADA,
Congress expected civil rights laws to be construed broadly to
effectuate their purpose. 6 ' If corporations are permitted to
invoke the foreign compulsion defense successfully under such
a broad interpretation, the purpose of the acts will not be effec-
tuated, but undermined; the acts which were remedial mea-
sures, will fail. Ultimately, not only will the extraterritorial
provisions be nullified, but Congressional intent to extend
employment protection to all U.S. citizens will be vitiated.
Such a broad and improper interpretation of the defense
begs the question "what next?" After the Supreme Court's tacit
approval of this decision, overseas corporations will be able to
assert that several types of practices in their host countries are
law. This holding will enable an American corporation overseas
to research and find a domestic case holding that a nontradi-
tional "law" is law in the U.S. and contend that therefore it is
also law in the host country, whether that is actually the case
or not. Alternatively, U.S. companies on foreign soil may suc-
cessfully exempt their liability by including a discriminatory
provision in a labor contract and enforcing it in a foreign court.
Again, whether the discriminatory conduct is actually the law
in the host country will be of no consequence, as the U.S.
transnational companies are invited to utilize this manipula-
tive strategy to immunize their own noncompliance.
This holding also invites multinational corporations to
assert that policy and practice in a foreign country constitute
law. Such concepts are inherently vague. Absent judicial guid-
160. See H.R. REP. No. 102-83, 102d Cong., at 20 (1991). ("[all Federal laws
protecting the civil rights of such persons shall be interpreted consistent with the
intent of such laws, and shall be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of
such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide effective remedies").
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ance in distinguishing them from "law," U.S. companies over-
seas inevitably will allege that traditions and customs are law,
and likely will be successful. Once the distinction between law
and policy disintegrates, the defense potentially will succeed
100% of the time. Consequently, any act applying
extraterritorially will be completely nullified by its foreign
compulsion defense. A more perfect example of an exception
swallowing a rule cannot be envisioned. Thus, such an inter-
pretation cannot be tolerated.
VI. CONCLUSION
This decision is so crucial and so troubling since it was the
first to arise after the ADEA's amendment became effective 1
and this was the first court with the opportunity to construe
the foreign law conflict exception under the ADEA. In fact, the
EEOC took this case and attempted review by the U.S. Su-
preme Court precisely to achieve a determination of "foreign
law" for purposes of the foreign compulsion defense, and finally
to afford a remedy to seniors victimized by age discrimination
overseas. 62 To much chagrin, the Court of Appeals not only
ascertained a vehicle by which to deny overseas protection,
they defined foreign law so expansively, they grossly deviated
from established precedent, and confused the state of the law
regarding the scope of the foreign compulsion defense for the
ADEA, the ADA, and Title VII.
Courts have strained to find rationales to preclude extra-
territorial application of U.S. laws ever since U.S. employees
sought to protect their legal national rights in U.S. courts. In
antitrust litigation, courts developed the defense of sovereign
state compulsion to preclude liability. Additionally, the judicia-
ry adopted the confusing and tenuous FLSA analysis which
relied on several, and substantively immaterial incorporations
before one can conclude the ADEA has only territorial effect.
Even subsequent to the ADEA's amendment, courts deter-
mined that the cause of action occurred prior to the amend-
ment to justify not applying the amendment because of con-
161. See Lauderdale, supra note 42, at 208.
162. Telephone Interview with Lairold M. Street, Senior International Attorney,
Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Commerce (Oct. 14, 1996). Mr. Street
was formerly litigation advisor for the external litigation branch of the EEOC and
was co-counsel for the Mahoney class in their action against RFERL.
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cerns of retroactivity. Regarding the ADA and Title VII, courts
expanded the definition of the BFOQ defense to include prefer-
ences by foreign countries. Alternatively, with respect to the
ADA and Title VII, courts simply held legislative directives to
extend the acts overseas were necessary. Finally, Congress
amended all the discrimination acts to extend
extraterritorially, and out of equity to multinational corpora-
tions, it also incorporated the foreign compulsion defense. In-
deed, the legislature accepted the invitations of several courts,
including the Supreme Court, to extend the application explic-
itly. Yet, courts still strain to find an exception upon which
they can justify precluding overseas protection as the Court of
Appeals did in Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.
This case was wrongly decided. Beyond the global implica-
tions of such a misplaced analysis, the U.S. workers victimized
by blatant age discrimination are left unemployed and
unremedied. In today's increasingly global community, similar
scenarios will only proliferate.
Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Supreme Court
to review a foreign compulsion defense case and conclusively to
determine its interpretation. The lack of precision in the de-
fense, prevalent'in so many acts, is unfair to both employees
and employers. Moreover, the Court should establish that the
interpretation is to be narrow, and that the employer relying
on the defense must prove that the host government actually
compelled the violation. A reading that is consistent with most
of the foreign compulsion defense cases would be the only man-
ner in which Congressional purpose can be implemented.
Randi Seltzer
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